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DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE REPORT CONCERNING
BAR PRIMARY
May 7, 1930.
Mr. John H. Denison, President,
Denver Bar Association,
Denver, Colorado.
The Judiciary Committee, which has been directed by
the Executive Committee and the Board of Trustees to
arrange for the holding of a Bar Primary with reference to
the selection of approved candidates for the District Bench
at the forthcoming General Election, begs leave to submit the
following report and recommendations:
The Committee has borne in mind that it is not a function
of the lawyers of the community to dictate to the voting public
who should be elected, or even who should be candidates for
election, to the Bench. The proper function of the Bar we
conceive to be merely to indicate what candidates are approved and recommended to the public by a majority of the
Bar, and to urge their election.
The Committee has in mind also that the lawyers, representing as they do all of the public as they appear as litigants
in court, and being acquainted with the requirements of the
judicial office and acquainted also with the judicial qualifications of the lawyers, in a very true sense occupy a unique position qualifying them to give impartial and informed counsel
to the voting public.
The Committee has received suggestions from a number
of members of the Bar proposing plans for a bar primary.
One plan, strongly recommended, proposes an initial
primary in which the candidates shall be confined to present
judges of the District Bench, and a selection from among them
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of such of the present judges as shall receive a majority vote
of the members of the Bar voting, such judges as shall fail to
receive a majority vote becoming ineligible as candidates in a
further Bar Primary. It is contemplated that any vacancies
resulting from this first primary shall be filled through a
second general primary open to all members of the Bar of
Denver who wish to be candidates.
The Committee is of the opinion that the qualification
of any judge on the Bench is a relative matter and should be
considered with reference to the qualification of every other
candidate whether on or off the Bench. The Committee concedes that consideration should be given to the experience of
and service rendered by any judge sitting, but is of the opinion
that such consideration will be given its due weight by the
members of the Bar in an open primary in which all available
candidates are considered. The Committee is further of the
opinion that this proposed plan would have a tendency to
unduly inject a personal element in the selection of candidates
and to incite controversy that should be avoided.
A second plan suggested to the Committee contemplates
an open primary for all seeking to be candidates in which
each candidate shall make known his party affiliation, and in
which each member of the Bar shall be permitted to vote for
not more than four of any one political party, all with the
eventual purpose of selecting seven candidates, no more than
four of whom shall belong to any one political party. This
plan is thought by a majority of the Committee to be objectionable because it calls for discrimination and support on
account of party affiliation and for the further reason that it is
believed by the Committee that from the party standpoint it
would not be satisfactory to either of the political parties and
the plan would diffuse and weaken the influence of the members of the Bar and involve difficulties of a practical nature.
A third plan proposed contemplates the selection of two
tickets of seven candidates each, one Republican and the other
Democratic, these tickets to be submitted to the respective
party assemblies for approval. As an adjunct to this plan it
has further been proposed that after the party primaries have
been held the Bar should have a further primary to choose
from among the fourteen candidates of the two political
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parties seven candidates who shall constitute the Bar ticket and
receive the Bar support. This plan is thought by the Committee to be also objectionable for the reason that it requires
discrimination and support on account of party affiliation and
because of necessary practical difficulties in its operation and
an excessive weakening and frittering away of the influence
of the Bar.
A fourth plan has been proposed to the Committee, which
after very careful consideration and notwithstanding some
practical objections that may be made to it, is believed by your
Committee to be more satisfactory than any other proposed
plan.
The Committee recommends that a Bar Primary be held
for the selection of seven approved candidates for the District Bench, wholly without reference to their party affiliations.
The Committee is convinced that the members of the Bar
will give due consideration to the merits of every candidate
without regard to his party politics and that every lawyer
who aspires to the Bench may rely upon a fair consideration
of his merits as a.lawyer and candidate, whethzr he be a Republican or a Democrat. The Committee is further of the
opinion that the selection of seven candidates on this plan will
tend to integrate the influence of the Bar and at the same time
create greater confidence in its judgments than can be possible
under any other plan. It is the belief of the Committee that if
lawyers aspire to places upon the Bench they should first look
to the approval of their fellow members of the Bar, and that
the good repute of judges at the Bar and the satisfaction that
they create in the members of their own profession should be
a chief criterion of their acceptability as candidates. It is
believed that the time is now ripe for a vigorous stand by the
members of the Bar upon the sound principle that takes account of the merit and fitness of candidates alone, and for a
recognition of the duty of the Bar to render the aid it is capable of giving to the voters in the wise selection of judges. A
due respect for the judicial office and of the relation of the
Bar to that office calls for a united and courageous effort of
the entire Bar toward this common end. If as a result of well
considered and energetic effort on the part of the Bar the
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election of its approved candidates can be assured, as the
Committee believes possible, a long step will be taken to
permanently strengthen the influence of the Bar and to make
it a more effective instrument for the maintenance of a fearless, impartial and competent judiciary. A plan similar to
that now proposed, although not completely successful, resulted in the most effective Bar Primary we have ever held,
that of 1912.
The Committee, therefore, proposes that a Bar Primary
be held for the approval of those seven candidates for the District Bench who shall receive the highest number of votes of
the members of the Bar; that such selection be made without
reference to the party affiliations of the candidates; that such
seven approved candidates be known by an appropriate title
to be selected by the Judiciary Committee; and that the hearty
support of every member of the Bar be invoked in behalf
of such approved candidates down to and including the election in November.
The Committee further proposes:
1. That every resident member of the Denver Bar be
eligible as a possible candidate and as a voter in the primary.
2. That proper provision shall be made for the secrecy
of the individual ballot.
3. That nominations of candidates shall be invited from
all members of the Bar to be submitted within a period prescribed by the Committee.
4. That the names of all candidates so nominated shall
be published and shall appear on the first ballot.
5. That on each ballot the voter must vote for seven
candidates.
6. That after the first vote the names of not less than
fifteen candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall
be selected to appear on the second ballot.
7. That after the second vote the names of not less than
ten candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall
be selected to appear on the third ballot.
8. That on the third vote the seven candidates having
the highest number of votes shall constitute the candidates
approved and recommended by the Bar.
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9. That the Judiciary Committee be vested with full
power to make rules and regulations to govern, and to decide
all questions relating to, the holding of the primary and to
take such further steps, as in its judgment appear necessary,
to consummate the final election of the seven candidates
recommended by the Bar.
Respectfully submitted,
THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,

By D. W. Strickland, Chairman.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
BAR
By Albert L. Vogl of the Denver Bar
I judge from what happened at the recent hearing in
Denver before an examiner of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that members of the Denver Bar are not advised of
the fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission has established its own Bar.
In order to practice before that Commission, it is necessary that the practitioner be "admitted". The Commission's
Bar is divided up into two classes, designated as "a" and "b";
class "a" consists of attorneys regularly admitted to practice
before the highest court of any State, and class "b" consists
of traffic men whose particular training or experience is calculated to qualify them to be of assistance to the Commission
in matters which come before it.
In order for attorneys to be admitted, it is necessary to
file an application on a form which is furnished by the Commission and attached thereto must be the certificate of the
clerk of the highest court of the State, certifying that the applicant is admitted to practice in that court, and that the applicant is in good standing and has never been disbarred.
In view of the frequency with which controversies before
the Commission become the subject of public interest in this
State, the foregoing may be of interest to the Bar.

IS THE RECORDING OF A DEED
EVIDENCE OF DELIVERY?
By Samuel H. Sterling of the Denver Bar
OME uncertainty exists in the minds of attorneys examining titles to real property in regard to the effect of
a deed recorded long after execution, arising from the
decision of Mr. Justice Campbell in Larison vs. Taylor, 83
Colo. 430, and the construction placed upon this decision by
Mr. Albert J. Gould in his article in the September "Dicta".
It is a frequent experience to encounter a transfer of
property where a year or more has elapsed between the execution of a deed and its recording. In fact, title examiners
not uncommonly find that in the majority of transfers of
property there has been a lapse between the execution of the
deed and its recordation. Whether the "long time" rule
enunciated by Mr. Justice Campbell is a proper cause of
anxiety to the examiner of ordinary and reasonable prudence,
and whether a month, a year, or three years is a "long time"
are our present problems.
To begin with, in examining the case of Larison v. Taylor,
it is pertinent to notice that this case was decided in the
Supreme Court, March 19, 1928, and a rehearing denied on
April 9, 1928. The 1927 State Legislature, in Senate Bill,
Number 274, passed "An act concerning real property and
to render titles to real property and to interests and estates
therein, more safe, secure and marketable", which was approved with an 'Emergency Clause' attached March 28, 1927.
This act was, therefore, in effect when the case of Larison v.
Taylor reached the Supreme Court. Although this legislative Act was passed apparently to apply to all cases which
involved titles to real estate, this Act was neither pleaded in
the County Court, where the Larison Case was tried, nor
mentioned in the decisions of the County or Supreme Courts.
In view of the fact that Chapter 150, of the 1927 Session Laws
was not considered in handing down the decision on this case,
we may assume either that the Act was considered inapplicable
to the case, or that it was overlooked.
The applicability of the Act to the Larison Case cannot
be doubted, for the heading proclaims that the Act is to 'ren-
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der titles to real property-more safe, secure and marketable',
and then provides in Section 1, seventh paragraph:
"If such instrument be acknowledged in the manner herein provided
and recorded in the office of the proper county clerk and recorder, it shall
also be prima fade evidence of due delivery."

This paragraph is merely an enunciation of the rule adjudicated in a majority of jurisdictions, as stated in 8 R.C.L.
1005:
"Delivery may be inferred from the fact of acknowledgment.

Like-

wise, the fact that a deed is on record is prima fade evidence of delivery and
acceptance, or, as otherwise stated, warrants a presumption of delivery and
acceptance, so that whoever makes assertion to the contrary has the burden
of proving it. Moreover, since recording takes the place of the solemn ceremonies accompanying livery of seizin at common law, it has been called evidence of delivery of the most cogent character, requiring the countervailing

proof to be clear and persuasive."

The statement that "whoever makes assertion to the contrary
(that there was no delivery of the recorded deed) has the
burden of proving it" may be in direct conflict with the rule
laid down by Mr. Justice Campbell that "Where delivery of
a deed is placed in issue, the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting delivery." However, we are not considering
which party has the burden of proof, for even under the rule
of Larison v. Taylor an equitable result is reached, because
of the particular facts involved. In any case, however, involving title to property, even though the one seeking to establish a delivery has the burden of proof, he is still able t9
take advantage of the legislative sanction of a prima facie evidence of delivery in his favor, where there has been a deed
recorded, and he is only bound to go forward and sustain his
burden of proof in those cases where the opponent has brought
in evidence to rebut his prima facie evidence. We mention
this because of the statement of Mr. Justice Campbell that the
County Court in hearing the Larison Case mistakenly placed
the burden of proof on the wrong party, and we wish to show
merely that, even though the proponent of the deed has the
burden of proof, he still has the prima facie evidence of delivery to support his case where there has been a recording.
Since our contention is that recording is a prima facie
delivery, it would be well to note the devolution of our present
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system of acknowledgment and recording. The ceremony of
acknowledging and recording a deed is wholly of statutory
origin, it being unknown at common law. The oldest form
of livery of seisin was superseded by the refinement of a writing executed in the presence of witnesses, but this in turn, has
been superseded by a form of acknowledgment contained in
Section 1, Session Laws of 1927, containing the legislative
fiat that
"any instrument relating-to title to real property acknowledged substantially" in the given form shall "-be prima facie evidence: First: That the
person named therein as acknowledging the instrument, appeared in person
before the official taking the acknowledgment, and was personally known to
such official to be the person whose name was subscribed to the instrument
and that such person acknowledged that he signed the instrument as his
own free and voluntary act for the uses and purposes therein set forth."

"Prima facie evidence" is used, then, in the Real Property
Act of 1927 in two places-first, the proper acknowledgment
"is prima facie evidence of the proper execution thereof" and
secondly, proper acknowledging and recording is "prima facie
evidence of due delivery." The term "prima facie evidence"
has been defined as meaning evidence "which suffices for the
proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by
other evidence." Dodson v. Watson, 110 Tex. 355, 220 S.W.
771. Accordingly, the effect of the statute is not to shift the
burden of proof as to delivery, but merely requires the party
asserting that there has been no acknowledgment or delivery
to bring in evidence to rebut the prima facie evidence of
recording.
Although in Larison v. Taylor the Court merely repeated
the bald statement of the rule contained in 18 C. J. 413 as to
burden of proof, without allowing the defendants the benefit
of their prima facie evidence as provided by the legislature,
yet the facts of that case were so strongly in favor of the plaintiff as to overcome the prima facie evidence of the defendant's
recording, and no evidence was brought in by the defendant
to uphold his case. However, in other cases the opponent
might not present such a preponderance of evidence.
Now as to the statement that "There is no presumption
of the delivery of a deed where it is not recorded until long
after its date" citing 18 C.J. 420 as authority, there is evidently
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some error as to authorities, for Mr. Justice Campbell quotes
this passage as authority with the declaration that there are a
"large number of cases" following this rule. From an examination of the text it appears that there are only two cases in
support of this principle, one of them being Cussack v.
Tweedy, 126 N.Y. 81, 26 N.E. 1033, involving an imperfect
and incomplete deed which was recorded without the signature of some of the grantors. This case arose upon the recording of the deed after a lapse of 50 years between the supposed
execution and recording. In the other cited case, BouvierLager Coal Land Co. v. Sypher, 186 Fed. 644, the deed in
question was not presented for record until 9 years after its
date, and title was not asserted by the persons claiming under
the grantee for nearly 50 years after its date of execution, or
40 years after its recording. All the parties to the supposed
deed had died, and also the officer before whom 'it was purported to have been acknowledged, and furthermore, the deed
was acknowledged by an unknown person, who was not shown
to have had any connection with the grantee.
We notice one characteristic common to both of these
cases, that it was not the time which had elapsed between the
execution of the deeds and their recording which was objectionable, but the judgments were based in both cases on other
matters. In the Cussack case, the objectionable feature was
that the deed under which the plaintiffs claimed title was
lacking the signatures of several grantors, and so, irrespective
of the lapse of 50 years before recording, they could not claim
title to the land. In the Bouvier case the fault lay in an
acknowledgment by a person other than the grantee. When
the acknowledgment failed, no presumption of delivery
existed, and, furthermore, the failure of the persons claiming
under the deed to assert their rights for a period of 40 years
influenced the court in its conclusion. It was evidence dehors
the deed which really prevented recovery of the land. In both
cases it is apparent that it was not the mere delay in recording
which created a presumption of non-delivery.
Returning to the Larison Case, we now find that the principle enunciated by Coipus Juris, that there is "no presumption of delivery where a long time has elapsed" is entirely inapplicable to the Larison Case. In the first place, the prin-
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ciple based on the two cases in Corpus Juris does not remotely
apply to nor touch upon the Larison Case. A lapse of 40 or
50 years may be conceded to be a "long time", but in view of
the Colorado statute as to prima facie evidence, 6 years cannot
be such a "long time" as to come under the principle of the
other two cases.
In the Larison case, even though there had been a recording of the deed the day after it was executed, there can be no
doubt the Supreme Court would have arrived at the same
conclusion. It is a maxim of law that fraud vitiates all things,
and recorded deeds are no exception to the rule. The plaintiff,
Larison, never had the slightest intention of delivering the
deed until she died, and this having been proved and relied
upon as a ground for cancelling and discharging a warranty
deed, especially one obtained through fraud, would be a good
reason for the decision in the Larison Case whether the deed
was recorded a day after its execution or six years later, as
was actually the fact. This being true, the statement that
"There is no presumption of the delivery of a deed where it
is not recorded until long after its date" is mere dicta, or at
the most, a conclusion founded upon cumulative evidence
which was not necessary for the final decision of the Larison
Case. Not only was it unnecessary, but it was also inapplicable
to the case, for the authorities cited in its support, if taken
case by case and compared, are not comparable in any of their
facts. Therefore this principle cannot stand as law, and its
further recognition can only cause a vicious doctrine to become law, and this in contravention to the express provisions
of our statutes, which seem to have been overlooked or disregarded.
Just how misleading this 'long time' doctrine may be, is
apparent from the article written by Albert Gould, Jr. in the
September, 1929, issue of 'Dicta', accepting the logical import of Mr. Justice Campbell's statement. Mr. Gould, upon
the authority of this statement, maintained that an escrow
agreement, or any deed, may be questioned where there has
been a long delay in recordation. As a practical matter, his
suggestions regarding the drawing up of escrow agreements
in such a manner as to show the reasons for the lapse of time
between the execution of a deed and its recordation, are ex-
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cellent. However, this can only serve as a possible means of
avoiding trouble in the future, and on the other hand, the
lack of a clause in a deed explaining the delay does not, and
should not, render that instrument any more questionable, as
to delivery, under Mr. Justice Campbell's decision in the
Larison v. Taylor case than it has in the past.
Since the logical import of the 'long time' doctrine should
have no effect, or at the most, should be confined to cases involving fraud and deceit, or other defects in the deed besides
delayed recordation, this means that the general and established rules are to have full force and effect, especially in view
of Section 44, of the Real Property Act of '27, which states
"It is hereby declared to be the policy in this state that this act and
all other acts and laws concerning or affecting title to real property and every
interest therein and all recorded instruments-shall be liberally construed and
with the end in view of rendering such titles absolute and free from technical
defects, and so that subsequent purchasers and incumbrances-may rely on
the record title, and so that the record title of -the party in possession shall be
sustained and not be defeated by technical or strict constructions."

With the purpose and intent of the Legislature so precise-

ly and exactly expressed, and the 'long time' rule shown to be
generally inapplicable, it is only logical that the general rule,
as expressed in the note to 54 L.R.A. 884 be given effect:
"The general rule, undoubtedly, is that a presumption of delivery
arises from the fact that a deed has been recorded, which presumption arises
from the bare fact of recording. Especially where the deed is reorded by
the grantor."

Of course, where the deed is recorded by the grantee, either
unauthorizedly or fraudulently, lack of delivery can always
be pleaded by the grantor.
To summarize, Mr. Justice Campbell's statement of the
law that "There is no presumption of the delivery of a deed
where it is not recorded until long after its date" should not
control in ordinary cases, where there is a lapse of time between the execution of a deed and the recording thereof, for
the foregoing reasons:
1. This statement of the rule taken from Corpus Juris is derived
from two cases which differ from the Larison Case so fundamentally that
the cases are in no way similar to it. Therefore, any rule derived from these
cases cannot serve as sound authority for the rule announced in the Larison
Case, nor control in determining titles to real property.
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reason for deciding the case as it was eventually decided. The plaintiff in
the Larison Case proved non-delivery so conclusively that she could have
obtained a judgment regardless of any other proof, and it is this evidence of
non-delivery that decided the case. The 'long time' doctrine did not enter
into the final decision of the case, and since the case was decided on principles
extraneous to this, the 'long time' doctrine is dictum, and as such is not controlling in any contingency where there has been a lapse of time between
the execution and recording of the deed.
3. The legislature has expressed in a clear and concise manner the
general principle that acknowledging and recording of a deed shall be prima
facie evidence of its delivery.
4. Since the 'long time' rule is ineffective as to its applicability to
deeds, the general rule, which is the rule announced by our legislature, governs, and the acknowledging and recording of a deed are prima facie evidence
of its delivery.

IN RE SUPREME COURT LIBRARY
The following letter addressed to the Editor has been
received and seems to embody a suggestion worth thinking
about. Dicta invites comment on the matter.
The Supreme Court Library is the one place in Colorado
where all the law on a given question can be found; it not
only has the most books, but they are available when wanted,
which is not always true of many of the Denver building
libraries.
In the past I have, by permission, spent some evenings
working there, and the ease with which work can be done at
night in a well-equipped room away from street noises, in a
library from which no book has been taken far away to rest
on another lawyer's desk, where if a book is out it can always
be found in some other series of reports, and where there is
a late text on almost every subject, has made me wonder why
some arrangement is not made for the use of this library in
the evenings.
It seems to me that it would be worth while for the
Denver Bar Association to see if some arrangement could be
worked out with the Supreme Court for the use of the library
at night under proper supervision paid for by the court or by
the bar association.
Yours very truly,
BENTLEY M. MCMULLIN.

RAMBLING COMMENTS ON PLATO'S
REPUBLIC
(PLATO 428-347 B. C.)
By F. L. Grant of the Denver Bar

AWYERS have always been interested in Plato's Republic because it was an attempt by one of the most
famous philosophers of all times to set forth his views
of an ideal state of society, its organization and method of
government.
In order to understand Plato's Republic it is necessary
to go back to Socrates because Plato's philosophy was based
largely upon the philosophy of his teacher, Socrates. Socrates is described as having been very homely, with large head,
flat nose, squatty body, but because of his unassuming simplicity he was beloved by his pupils and those with whom he
came in contact. He wore uncouth garments, and so far as
history records never seemed to have had any occupation or
business, and yet he never seemed to worry. How he lived
nobody seemed to know; he never worked and took no thought
of the morrow. He was always a welcome guest away from
home, but not so welcome in his own home, because it was
said he neglected his wife and children, and from his wife's
point of view he was a "good for nothing". Nevertheless she
remained loyal to him throughout his life.
Socrates was very modest and unassuming in his
knowledge. He frequently said, "One thing only I know, and
that is that I know nothing;" also, "That philosophy begins
when one begins to doubt those beliefs which one had never
before doubted."
For eight years Plato had lived in the greatest intimacy
with Socrates as his teacher and Plato's works show that his
whole subsequent life was influenced by it. Following the
death of Socrates in 399 B. C. Plato devoted himself to philosophy, and largely along the paths of inquiry which Socrates
had opened to him.,
The Republic is written in a conversational style covering
ten chapters, with Socrates as the principal interlocutor, generally expounding Plato's own views, in conversations held
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with different individuals, principally Glaucon and Adeimantus, brothers of Plato, with an old man named Cephalus and
his son Polemarchus, and with a sophist named Thrasymarchus.
According to the Republic Socrates went about presenting
unto the human mind and discussing all kinds of abstract questions such as "What is justice?" "What is truth?" "What
is religion?" "What are Morals?"
To show that human nature has not changed greatly in the
last 2500 years let me quote the following conversation which
Socrates (according to Plato) addressed to his pupil Glaucon:
"Do you think it at all less scandalous, when a man not
only consumes the greater part of his life in courts of law as
plaintiff or defendant, but actually has the vulgarity to plume
himself upon this very fact, boasting of being an adept in
crime, and such a master of tricks and turns, of manoeuvre and
evasion, as always to be able to wriggle out of the grasp of
justice, and escape from punishment, and that for the sake of
worthless trifles, not knowing how much nobler and better it
were to order his life as never to stand in need of a sleepy
judge." (Davies & Vaughan's Translation, page 101).
Philosophy in those days was taught not from books but
while walking about and in conversation. Socrates would
have his pupils with him and while walking about through
the groves and parks of Athens would discuss with them the
philosophy of life. Socrates died because he taught a philosophy that was contrary to the accepted views of his time. Jesus
died because he taught a doctrine contrary to the accepted
views of his time. It has always seemed strange that Jesus
received so severe a punishment for such a seemingly slight
offense, and yet 400 years before Socrates had met his death
for the same reason. Plato likewise would have met a similar
fate had he not concluded about then on the suggestion of
friends, that it was a good time to leave Athens and visit other
places. So he withdrew to Megara and then started on his
travels through Egypt and Asia, from which places he did not
return for twelve years. When he returned to Athens about
388 B. C. he taught philosophy for about forty years, and like
Socrates received no fees for his teachings, and taught, it is
supposed, chiefly through conversation.
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He established a kind of open air school in a grove which
had belonged to a man named Academos, and which was therefore called the Acadameia or Academy.
Durant says: "Woe to him who teaches men faster than
they can learn. Socrates taught that the state should be governed by its wisest men; that the mob, the great mass, are hopelessly incapable of governing. He proclaimed the right of
free thought and the right to differ from the accepted thought
of his day, and his life was the penalty, and Athens humiliated
and disgraced herself by his trial and death."
Plato whose original name was Aristocles, but changed
to Platon or Plato, presumably because of the unusual breadth
of his shoulders, had been brought up in comfort. He was the
son of parents of considerable means. He was handsome,
vigorous, and a great athlete. He was probably twenty or
twenty-two, when he first met Socrates. He was twenty-eight
when Socrates died. He loved Socrates dearly and once afterwards said: "I thank God that I was born Greek and not
barbarian, freeman and not slave, man and not woman, but
above all that I was born in the age of Socrates."
Plato was deeply affected by those social and political
conditions which brought about the death of Socrates. It filled
him with a hatred of democracy more intense than was bred
into him by his aristocratic boyhood. The absorbing topic of
his life was to find a method whereby the wisest might be discovered and then induced to rule. That was the primary
reason for the writing of his Republic. His dialogues remain
one of the great literary treasures of the world, and again
drawing on Durant, the best of them "The Republic" is a complete treatise in itself covering a great range of philosophic
thought, metaphysics, theology, ethics, psychology, pedagogy,
politics, the theory of art, and such modern subjects as eugenics, birth control, feminism, socialism, and communism.
Socrates, according to Plato, did not believe in democracies because although beautiful in theory, they did not work
out in practice; he believed that the great bulk of the people
of any country were hopelessly inadequate to rule, and that in
the last analysis only those properly qualified to hold office
should be elected to office; that public office requires specially
trained men;-just as a physician must be trained to care for
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people who are sick, or shoemakers to make shoes, so must
men be trained for public office. He believed that the first
ten years of life should be devoted exclusively to physical
training, and play and sport should cover the entire curriculum. From ten years on general education should commence, with particular stress on music and gymnastics. That
as men and women advanced in years they should undergo
tests or examinations, the unsuccessful ones dropping out and
performing the manual labor while the successful ones, becoming fewer and fewer, should go on, studying particularly
the problems of state, competing in business and learning the
cold-blooded problems of business by actual contact, so that
by the time they arrived at the prime of life those only who
survived this process of examination and elimination would
be qualified for selection as rulers of the state, they becoming
the rulers automatically. Even then, however, the weedingout process would not be complete because one would have to
first fill a minor office, and enter a process of promotion before
serving in the highest offices of the state and nation. These
rulers were to be called guardians and one of the qualifications
was that they should not own property; that what property
they used should be owned in common, nor were they to receive salaries, but were to be provided with only the necessaries of life; that the remuneration which would be theirs
for the performance of their duties would be the honor of
holding such positions. This he thinks would take away the
greed for money which has always a warping and detrimental
effect on the individual. Another provision was that the guardians should have no wives, but might associate promiscuously
with the female guardians. Women were to be selected as
guardians because of their perfection, mentally and physically, and the law of eugenics would be invoked in the procreation of posterity.
There would be no sex barrier of any kind, and if a
woman showed herself more capable of administering the
affairs of an office she was to receive it. When one of the
pupils objected to women being given equal rights with men,
Socrates replied that division of labor should be based upon
ability and not sex. Chi!dren brought into the world through
the union of these selected guardians would not know their
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parents, but would be reared under special nurses in state
nurseries. This theory by the way may seem utterly chimerical, and yet it is in force in Russia today under the Soviet
Government; and while not made compulsory it is becoming a
common practice in Russia for parents to have their children
educated in these general nurseries, under state supervision,
on the theory that these nurses are especially trained for the
rearing of children and that the children get far better care
and attention in this manner than they would get from
ordinary parents, ignorant of how to properly train children,
except possibly in the homes of the wealthy where specially
trained nurses can be employed. There may be more in this
theory than might appear at first blush.
Socrates, according to Plato, even provided against the
accumulation of wealth in the individual, so that anyone
acquiring more than four times the average possessions of the
citizens would be required to relinquish the excess to the state.
Whether Plato's ideal state can ever be even approximately realized is of course open to violent discussion, and
would undoubtedly require the remoulding of human nature,
or at least its progressive evolution. Plato himself admits
the plan would be an ideal rather than a practical working
model.
The story of the Republic ends with the tale of Er, a
soldier who was thought to have been killed in battle, but on
the twelfth day after his supposed death, he was revived or
came to life again and he then told what he had experienced
during the twelve days interim and how the just were rewarded and the unjust punished, possibly as a sort of reminder
to those who were just or unjust while living on this earth,
of what might be expected in the hereafter.

A copy of 70 Colorado, upon which appears no mark
indicating ownership, has been in Division 1 of the District
Court for some time, uncalled for. Whose is it?

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDrrox's NorE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

TITLE-LIENS--OPTIONS-No. 12279Thomas E. Anderson vs. E. H. Pihistrom Investment Company, et al.-DecidedMay 19, 1930.
Facts.-This is a suit to quiet title to property, alleging
title and possession. The defendant, the Title Investment
Company, failed to answer. The defendant, E. H. Pihlstrom
Investment Company, cross-complained, claiming a lien for
$2500 which was evidenced by a certain recorded document.
The plaintiff contends that this document is no more than an
unexecuted option.
On July 2, 1924, the defendant obtained in a trade with
one Mrs. Rose A. Agnew, two notes, one for $1000, and the
other for $2491.23 secured by a deed of trust to property located in Jefferson County. Upon default, this property was
foreclosed and bid in by the defendant for the amount of the
smaller note. The defendant received a public trustee's deed
on May 15, 1926.
On June 26, 1925 Mrs. Agnew transferred the title to the
property in question (a residence in Denver) to the Defendant, The Temple Investment Company, of which she was
the organizer and the President.
On September 11, 1925, the recorded contract, which it is
now contended constitutes a lien, was executed. On January
5, 1926, The Temple Company transferred, by Quit Claim
Deed, the property now in question to the Plaintiff. This
deed was recorded on March 2, 1926 on which date Mrs.
Agnew died.
The terms of the contract in question, made between the
Pihlstrom Company and the Temple Investments Company,
provided if the Temple Company would pay the notes of
$1000 and $2491.23, the taxes, and the foreclosure costs by
executing a Deed of Trust to the Denver property (now in
question) within ten days after the Pihlstrom Company reSUITS
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ceived a Trustee's Deed to the Jefferson County property, that
then the Temple Company was to have the right to purchase
the Jefferson County property, and that this Deed of Trust
before mentioned was to constitute full consideration for the
transfer of the Jefferson County property to the Temple Company. It was further provided that time was the essence of
the contract. The rights of the Temple Company under this
contract were never exercised.
The lower court held that Plaintiff had title subject to
the lien claimed by the Defendant. Plaintiff alleged error.
Held.-"Undoubtedly this instrument is nothing more
than a mere conditional option" the privileges of which have
not been exercised. Accordingly, it can in no way be construed as a lien.
Reversed and Remanded.
OF-No. 12268-Martha A.
Brown and Hazel Brown Flanagan vs. The Estate of John
J. Roche, Deceased.-DecidedMay 19, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiffs, as sole heirs of D. W. Brown,
claimed 1212 shares of stock in the Rocky Mountain Fuel
Company from the estate of John J. Roche. The transaction
from which the claim arose contained the following writing,
"Apr. 4th 1922-In settlement made this date between D. W.
Brown and John J. Roche on Pfd and Common Stock R M F
shares of Pfd and Common Stock
Co, there are
Said Co-Still due D. W. Brown-John J. Roche". Between
the words "are" and "shares", there appeared a figure which
could be taken as 1212 or as 122. The County Court allowed
the claim for 1212 shares and an appeal was taken to the district court, where, from evidence not presented in the county
court, an award was made for 122 shares. The court found
that the last "1" in the figure "1212" was intended as a fractional line making the amount 122 shares. Plaintiffs allege
error.
Held.-The findings of fact of the district court on the
trial, without a jury, was well justified by the evidence, and
they will not be disturbed by the higher court.
CONTRACTS-INTERPRETATION
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oF-No. 12271Gus Stroup and J. L. Shepard, co-partners, doing business
under the firm name and style of Stroup and Shepard, and
Gus Stroup vs. P. C. Pearce-DecidedMay 19, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiff, Pearce sued to recover $635.60
alleged to be owing to him for hauling ties. The terms of the
written contract were substantially as follows.
In the first paragraph of the contract, the Plaintiff agreed
to haul ties from Dutton Creek Landing, Wyoming, to Rock
River, Wyoming, the job to be completed by a stipulated time.
The second paragraph of the contract provided that Stroup
was to pay 17c per tie for all ties hauled from Dutton Creek
Landing, "and the sum of 2c for each tie per mile or fraction
thereof hauled from above Dutton Creek Landing" plus the
17c for hauling from Dutton Creek Landing to Rock River.
The third paragraph provided that the Plaintiff should execute a bond to assure his performance.
The bond which was executed assured performance by
the Plaintiff in hauling from Dutton Creek Landing. The
question was whether or not the Plaintiff had obligated himself to haul ties from above Dutton Creek Landing.
The trial court held that the Plaintiff, by the terms of the
contract, had received the right to haul from above Dutton
Creek Landing for the additional compensation, but that he
had not obligated himself to do so. Judgment was given for
the Plaintiff.
Held.-If the contract was ambiguous, the parties, by
the execution of the bond, placed their own construction upon
it.
Judgment Affirmed.
CONTRACTS-SEVERABLE-CONSTRUCTION

PARTNERSHIP -

RETIRING PARTNER -

LIABILITY OF

-

No.

12554-Robert S. Faricy vs. J. S. Brown Mercantile Company, a Corporation-DecidedMay 12, 1930.
Facts.-Faricy and one M. C. Davis were engaged in a
partnership. The partnership was dissolved and Davis retained the assets of the firm and agreed to pay the existing
liabilities. Faricy notified the plaintiff company of the terms
of the agreement and told them to proceed to collect from
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Davis what was due them. Davis, it was alleged, was then
solvent and able to take care of his obligations. Subsequently,
Davis became insolvent. The Brown Company, not having
been paid instituted this action. The defendant contended
that the planitiff had not pursued its action against Davis diligently and that therefore this action should be barred. Judgment was had for the plaintiff in the trial court.
Held.-"Where a person agrees to assume the existing
obligations of a dissolved partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the
agreement consents to a material alteration in the nature or
time of payment of such obligations." Here, the creditor did
not consent nor can his refusal to sue Davis be construed as
consent to any alteration of the obligation.
Judgment Affirmed.
INJUNCTION-NAMES-RIGHT TO USE OF-No. 12242-L. I.
DaPronvs. J. T. Russell, doing business as DaPronSchool
of Dancing-Decided May 12, 1930.
Facts.-J.T. Russell brought this action to restrain the
defendant "from using the name DaPron in any manner pertaining to a school of ballet and ball room dancing." The
plaintiff came into ownership of a dancing school originally
owned and operated by the defendant. Defendant, a considerable time after the plaintiff owned the school, started another
school known as "The DaPron School for Ballet and Ball
Room Dancing." The plaintiff sought an injunction and the
defendant counter claimed for an injunction, each seeking to
enjoin the other from using the name DaPron in connection
with a ball room. The trial court dismissed the counter claim
and granted plaintiff an injunction. Defendant alleged error.
Held.-A man has a right to use his own name in conducting his business so long as he is not guilty of "fraud,
deceit, or other unfair or dishonest practice, or that he violated
some contractual obligation respecting the use" thereof.
Judgment reversed with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
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1215The South Boulder Canon Ditch Company, a Corporation
vs. The Davidson Ditch and Reservoir Company, a Corporation, and The New South Boulder and Rock Creek
Company, a Corporation.-DecidedMay 12, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiffs were junior and the Defendants
senior appropriators to water rights. Defendants, by virtue of
a decree of 1882, held an adjudicated right to a total of 218.37
cubic'feet per second. The Plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from using more than 66 feet of the defendant's decreed water on the grounds that the remainder had been
abandoned. The evidence showed that for a period of forty
years subsequent to the adjudication, the defendant used but
66 feet of the water. The lower court granted the injunction.
Defendant alleged error.
Held.-"While the record in this case undoubtedly discloses evidence of intention to abandon, other than that imputed by non use over a long period of years, still we have no
hesitancy in ruling that evidence of non-use of water for a
period of forty years in itself is sufficient to prove a prima
facie case of abandonment."
Judgment Affirmed.
WATER RIGHTS-PRIORITIES-ABANDONMENT-NO.

WATER RIGHTS - PERCOLATING WATERS - EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY OF-NO. 12276-The Pure Springs Supply Com-

pany, a Colorado Corporation vs. The Town of Olney
Springs, Colorado, et al.-Decided May 12, 1930.
Facts.-The Plaintiff Corporation sought to enjoin the
Defendant Municipality from using wells constructed by the
Defendant to supply its citizens, on the grounds that the Defendant's use caused a diminution of the Plaintiff's supply.
Plaintiff was prior in time and Defendant's wells were on
adjoining tract of land to that on which were the wells belonging to the Plaintiff. The trial court found for the defendant
stating that the Defendant's use did not interfere with the
Plaintiff's supply.
Held.-The Supreme Court will not disturb the findings
of fact of the trial court unless it appears that such findings
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are not sustained by the evidence.
Judgment Affirmed.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW-DISBARMENT-No. 12520-The People

of the State of Colorado ex rel The Colorado Bar Association Petitioner vs. Samuel Winograd-Decided May 5,
1930.
Facts.-On complaint by the Grievance Committee of the
Colorado Bar Association acting pursuant to rules of the
Supreme Court five specific charges were recorded against the
respondent. No evidence was offered as to one of the charges,
and the evidence as to another was brief and unsatisfactory.
The remaining three are namely:
1. The Flood-Konklin charge is to the effect that respondent failed to make settlement for monies collected by
him for his client until he was forced to do so.
2. One Price employed the respondent to file a mechanics lien, which respondent failed to do, so that his client was
deprived of his lien and compelled to employ another attorney.
3. Gonzales and Doninques employed the respondent to
represent them on a grand larceny charge. Respondent agreed
that if the defendant were given a penitentiary sentence he
would refund his fee. Defendant's clients were sentenced to
the penitentiary and respondent gave his note for the returnable fee. This note has not been paid.
Respondent Indefinitely Suspended.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW-DISBARMENT-No. 12592-The People

of the State of Colorado upon the Relation of the Attorney
General vs. John G. Powell-Decided May 5, 1930.
Facts.-Respondent,according to the charges against him
represented to Phillip Van Cise in the Ver Stratton case that
for proper consideration he could furnish the names of certain
members of the jury panel who would vote for acquittal. Respondent in his answer refused to admit the charges but would
not defend himself against them.
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Held.-"By failure to deny the same the respondent in
legal effect admits the charges to be true."
Respondent disbarred.
PROPER PARTIES - SALES--NO. 12295-The
Denver Milk Bottle, Case & Canned Exchange, Inc. vs. J.
A. McKinzie-Decided May 5, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff corporation composed of 75 members was organized to collect the bottles of its members and
re-distribute them to their proper owners. Compiled Laws
21 provides that the owners of milk bottles may register their
mark with the Secretary of State and stamp that mark upon
the bottles owned by them. All of plaintiff's members had
complied with the statute. Defendant who is not associated
with the Exchange admits possession of 110 bottles bearing
the names of 16 members of the Association. Defendant contended first that the plaintiff was not the party to bring the
action, but that it should have been brought by the members
whose bottles he held. Second, that injunction should not lie,
the plaintiff having adequate remedy at law, and third that
the defendant was the owner of the bottles in question. The
trial court held for the defendant and the plaintiff alleged
error.
Held.-l. The Exchange, in the furtherance of its
obvious corporate purpose can protect its various members.
Hence, if injunction is the proper action the plaintiff is the
proper party.
2. It having been shown that the cost of suit was clearly
more than the value of a recovery in an action to retrieve the
bottles or to recover their value, and in so far as such remedies
offer no protection against future offences "the preventive
remedy is injurction, the only remedy that is adequate."
3. As milk bottles are never sold but are merely loaned,
any deposit placed upon them by a consumer or dealer being
merely to insure their return, the defendant could not have
purchased them as he contended in so far as no title could pass
to him.
Reversed and Remanded.
INJUNCTION -
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12274
-M. C. Harringtonand R. W. Hershey as the Managerof
Safety and Excise ex officio Sheriff in the City and County
of Denver vs. Enoch Anderson.-Decided May 5, 1930.
Facts.-This was an action by Anderson to quiet title to
lands against which Harrington contended he held a lien. On
March 5, 1924, one Hahnwold executed a trust deed to the
Public Trustee to secure a loan made by the Western Finance
and Development Company. Subsequently because of default, foreclosure was had by the Public Trustee at which the
Star Investment Company became the purchasers. The Public Trustee issued a certificate of purchase on August 25th,
1925. On May 9th the State Bank Commissioner recovered
judgment against Hahnwold. On September 5th the judgment was assigned to the defendant. On February 18, 1926,
the Star Company recovered judgment in the District Court
against Hahnwold. There was no redemption from the
Trustee's sale during the six month period. On February 26th
the Star Company as a judgment creditor redeemed from the
sale. The Star Company got an execution on its judgment
and procured a sale by the sheriff. The sheriff's deed to the
Star Company was dated March 29th, 1926. Plaintiff acquired the rights of the Star Company. Plaintiff also paid
off a prior mortgage on the property and secured a release
thereof. Defendant procured an execution on his judgment,
and on September 21st a notice of levy on the land in question
was filed. Shortly before the time set for the sheriff's sale on
defendant's levy, plaintiff brought this action to quiet title.
The trial court held for the plaintiff.
Held.-Session Laws 23 Chapter 185 gives judgment
creditors of a mortgagor a right after the expiration of six
months, and before nine months to redeem lands which were
not redeemed by the mortgagor.
Plaintiff's grantor complied with the statute and defendant's grantor did not.
Judgment Affirmed.
QUIET TITLE-LIENS-PUBLIC TRUSTEE SALES-No.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-EASEMENT-LACK OF MEMORY
-INSTRUCTIONS--No.
12216-The Mountain States Tele-
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phone and Telegraph Company, a corporation vs. Charles
J. Sanger-DecidedMay 5, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff while riding a horse was injured by
colliding with the defendant's telephone lines, which crossed
his the plaintiff's land. Defendant had an easement over the
land to maintain their lines secured from Plaintiff's grantor.
From a judgment for the plaintiff for $9000 defendant brings
error.
Held.-l. Defendant had only such an easement as was
necessary for their use without any more than the peril necessarily involved in such use. Phone lines should not menace
travel.
2. An instruction that it was the defendant's duty to
maintain its lines so as not to interfere with the plaintiff's use
is objectionable, because it would deny the defendant's right
to the proper use of their easement if that use were inconsistent
with the plaintiff's use of his land.
3. An instruction stating the measure of damages and
enumerating "bodily pain", "mental suffering", "actual damages", "impairment of health" and "permanent injury" was
objected to as misleading in so far as all of these are included
in "actual damages", the court directs that the instruction be
remedied so as to avoid the possibility of being misleading.
4. Justifiable distraction and forgetfulness relieves a
party of contributory negligence. The question as to what
constitutes justifiable distraction is one for the jury.
5. A man can introduce evidence of his earning capacity,
even though he be a farmer with capital invested, not for the
purpose of offering a measure of damages but to aid the jury
in estimating a fair compensation for being prevented by the
complained of injury from engaging in his work.
Reversed and Remanded.
DOGS-RABIES-NEGLIGENCE

IN KEEPING DOGS-INSTRUC-

TIONS-No. 12292-John Carlberg vs. Joe Willmott-Decided May 5, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff kept a herd of milch cows one of which
was bitten by defendant's dog. The injured cow died from
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rabies, and plaintiff had his entire herd vaccinated. The plaintiff's evidence showed the reasonable value of the cow to be
$150 and the cost of vaccinating $100. Prior to this event the
town counsel had warned all owners of dogs to keep them
securely restrained, it having been learned that rabies was
prevalent in the community. Defendant admitted having been
warned but alleged that he had complied with the warning,
and that at the time the plaintiff's cow was injured the defendant's dog had been set free by another person against the defendant's wishes and without his knowledge. The case was
tried upon the theory of negligence exclusively, and not with
reference to the common law or statutory liability. Judgment
was had in the Justice of the Peace Court for $250, and defendant appealed to the County Court where verdict was
entered for $150. To review this judgment defendant brought
error.
Held.-I. When the owner of a dog knows of the presence of rabies in the community "he becomes liable for all
damages by reason of injuries inflicted by the dog when rabid."
2. Objections to instructions must be made in compliance with the rule 7 of the rules of the Supreme Court or it
will not be considered.
Judgment Affirmed.
DEED OF TRUST -

FORECLOSURE -

BROKERS--AGENCY-NO.

12,312-Alma Hahn vs. Bert L. Alexander, The Interstate
Securities Company, The Farmers State Bank of Brush,
Colorado, et al-DecidedApril 28, 1930.
Facts.-Alexander made a note dated January 2, 1917,
due January 2, 1924, secured by deed of trust on land in Washington County, Colorado. The note and interest coupons
attached to it were all made payable to The Interstate Securities Company in Minneapolis. March 8, 1917 the note was
assigned to John Hahn, and thereafter to Margaret Hahn, the
plaintiff in this case, who alleged that certain interest coupons
and the principal had not been paid, and prayed for judgment
against the makers and for a foreclosure of the deed of trust.
The evidence shows that the principal and interest were paid
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to The Interstate Securities Company but were not remitted
by it to Hahn. In 1924 the company went into the hands of a
receiver. The evidence showed that Hahn had owned
another loan which he had purchased from The Interstate
Securities Company, and had expressly authorized it to represent him in its collection. The lower court found that The
Interstate Securities Company was the agent of Hahn in this
case and not the agent of Alexander. Judgment was entered
for the defendant and foreclosure was denied.
Held.-The lower court was right and the various cases
cited by the plaintiff in support of her case were based upon
facts unlike those in the present case.
Judgment Affirmed.
IRRIGATING

WATER-PRIORITIES--ADJ UDICATION-JURISDIC-

TION-No. 12,582-Fred W. Hazard, et al vs. The Joseph
W. Bowles Reservoir Company, a corporation-Decided
April 29, 1930.
Facts.-In the general adjudication proceeding in the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Douglas
County plaintiff company was awarded a reservoir priority in
Patrick Lake. In the same proceeding the senior priority in
the same lake was awarded to Hazard but the decree thereafter was changed, making the corporation's priority senior to
that of Hazard. Thereafter the corporation brought suit for
an injunction to restrain Hazard from taking any of the water
from the Patrick reservoir which is contained in it from the
bottom of the present outlet of Bowles reservoir. The District
Court for the First Judicial District in Arapahoe County
issued an injunction restraining Hazard from using any of
the water from the reservoir.
Held.-The Arapahoe County District Court had no
jurisdiction to decide this question because the District Court
of Douglas County first acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate
the relative priorities of right to use water from the reservoir.
Thereafter no other District Court had any jurisdiction to
hear an action attempting to modify in any way the decree
entered by the District Court of Douglas County.
Judgment Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.
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CRIMINAL LAw-MURDER-EVIDENCE-NO. 12,493-Amelio

Herreravs. The People of the State of Colorado-Decided
April 28, 1930.
Facts.-Herrerawas convicted of murder in the first
degree for killing his wife. The evidence showed that he had
pulled her into a dark and narrow passage-way. Shortly thereafter there was the report of a gun shot, the scream of a woman
and three more gun shots. A man fled from the entry-way but
was not caught. Thereafter Herrera registered at a rooming
house under an assumed name. The next morning he was
arrested. His first story was that his wife had committed
suicide. This was followed by a statement that he had shot
her. His statement was again changed to a declaration that
the gun had been accidentally discharged while he and the
deceased were struggling for its possession.
Held.-Credibility of the witnesses was for the jury.
There was sufficient evidence to warrant the jury in finding
that Herrera was guilty. The verdict, therefore, will not be
disturbed.
Judgment Affirmed.
12,222-J. L.
Lengel vs. The CommercialBank of Las Animas, Colorado,
a Corporation-DecidedApril 28, 1930.
Facts.-In 1926 the State Bank Commissioner notified
the plaintiff below, The Commercial Bank of Las Animas,
that its capital stock was impaired, and ordered it to make an
assessment upon its capital stock of $100.00 per share. The
defendant Lengel, a stockholder, was notified in due course,
but refused to pay the assessment, whereupon the bank
brought its action and obtained a judgment for the assessment
and costs. Lengel defended on the ground that he had been
defrauded at the time the stock was sold to him by various
individuals who at the time of the sale were also officers of
the bank.
Held.-The fact that individual owners of corporate
stock had misrepresented the value of the stock or the condition of the bank is no defense to an action brought to secure
BANK

STOCK-ASSESSMENT-FRAUD--No.
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payment of an assessment made to restore the impaired capital,
and there is no estoppel against the bank to claim the assessment.
Judgment Affirmed.
PERSONAL INJURY-CITY ORDINANCE-CONSTRUCTION-NO.

12212-Kathryn Hicks, an infant, by Ella S. Hicks, her
next friend vs. George W. Cramer, et al-Decided April
28, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff,a minor, was riding in the rear seat of
an automobile driven by her father. Defendant's car approached from their left colliding with plaintiff's father's car
and plaintiff was injured. The Pueblo city ordinance provides,
first, that the vehicle on the right shall have the right of way,
and, second, that the one nearest the center of the intersection
shall have the right of way. The lower court instructed the
jury that if defendant's car had entered the intersection before
plaintiff's father's car, then defendant had the right of way,
but if plaintiff's father's car had entered the intersection first,
then it had the right of way. There was a verdict for the
defendant.
Held.-The lower court attempted to harmonize two inconsistent ordinances. The effect should have been given only
to the one giving the right of way to the vehicle approaching
from the right.
Reversed and Remanded.
FOR SALE
Pacific States Reports. 135 vols., in 40 books, extra annotated with Ross Digest 3 vols. All bound in buckram and in
fine condition.
Address, A. D. BULLIS, Fort Morgan, Colorado.
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